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I. Introductory remarks 
 
A. The amendment of the Spanish Civil Code 
 
In light of the repercussions it may have in international situations, opening-up civil 
marriage to same-sex couples by amending the Spanish Civil code (Cc)1 is perhaps 
one of the most remarkable changes in the Spanish legal system. This reform has 
been justified as an adaptation to Spanish social reality and2 is based on the 
constitutional principles of free development of personality (arts. 9.2 and 10.1 of the 
Spanish Constitution –CE–), preservation of freedom concerning the forms of 
cohabitation (art. 1.1 CE), and non-discrimination (art. 14 CE). Nevertheless, it has 
been confined to substantial issues. However, the lack of an ad hoc treatment of 
Private International Law (PIL) same-gender marriage issues should not be seen as 
oblivion or “idleness” by the Spanish legislator.3 It should be seen as the logical 
consequence of the legislator’s intent to ignore any difference between same-sex and 
different-sex marriages under Spanish law.4 Therefore, in international situations, the 
                                                 
 PhD, Lecturer in Private International Law, Complutense University of Madrid. 
1 Law N. 13/2005 of 1st July, amending the Spanish Civil Code concerning the right to celebrate 
a marriage, BOE n. 157, 2 July 2005. 
2 Even though the reform has been contested by some social groups, lead by the Spanish Catholic 
Church, it does have the support of the majority of society: one may not ignore that it is the result of the 
implementation of an electoral promise.  
3 See in this sense CALVO CARAVACA A.L./CARRASCOSA GONZÁLEZ J., “Matrimonio entre 
personas del mismo sexo y Derecho internacional privado español”, Diario La Ley n. 6319, 2 January 
2006. 
4 The impossibility of celebrating same-sex marriages in other countries is not, in my opinion, a 
valid reason for PIL rules to uphold the difference. On the one hand, the same-gender couples’ right to 
marry can be considered an “emerging civil right”: MARTIN J., “English Polygamy Law and the Danish 
Registered Partnership Act: A Case for the Consistent Treatment of Foreign Polygamous Marriages and 
Danish Same-Sex Marriages in England”, Cornell Int.L.J. 1994, 419-446, at 432-438. Actually, the recent 
opening-up of same-sex marriages in South Africa (15 November 2006) could confirm a trend towards 
the generalization of these marriages worldwide. On the other hand, even if it is true that there is a risk of 
conformation of limping relationships, first, this is not a reason to hinder the exercising of a right, and 
second, many foreign legal systems that do not regulate same-sex marriages do give legal effects to 
problems that almost immediately arise concerning the authorization of same-sex 
marriages reveal a failure in the existing rules to give every situation a suitable solution. 
Thus, the real issue is whether the Spanish PIL rules concerning (any) marriage are in 
need of revision.5 
The above-mentioned problems refer to the law(s) applicable to the 
authorization of same-sex marriages, where (at least) one of the intended spouses is a 
national of a State that does not recognize same-sex marriages. While many media 
outlets haled the celebration of same-sex marriages both between Spanish citizens 
and between Spanish citizens and foreign nationals, some civil registrars questioned 
the Constitutional Court about amended article (44 Cc)’s constitutionality.6 In addition, 
other registrars have denied the authorization through application of article 9.1 Cc, 
which refers “matters of capacity and civil state” to personal (national) law.7 
 
 
B. The reaction of the DGRN to PIL issues concerning same-sex marriages 
 
The DGRN, the  administrative body dependent on the Ministry of Justice and 
entrusted with “all the issues related to the Civil Register”,8 was swift to react9. In the 
very same month that the new regulation became effective, it made use of its advisory 
function by the means of a “Resolución-Circular”.10 This decision, which is  a source of 
law,11 eliminates the difficulties by declaring that Spanish law is applicable to the 
authorization of same-sex marriages, regardless of the spouses-to-be’s nationality. The 
DGRN concluded that permission to marry should be given when there is a Spanish 
civil registrar competent to decide on the authorization of a marriage12 and the 
                                                                                                                                               
foreign same-sex marriages by the means of their “conversion” into civil partnerships: see e.g. in England 
K. McK. Norrie “Recognition of Foreign Relationships Under the Civil Partnership Act 2004”, Journal of 
Private International Law April 2006, 137-167, at 161-165. Thus, it is true that the uneven recognition of 
same-sex marriages within the European Union shows a lack of uniform values that threatens the 
possibility of unification of Private International Family Law and gives rise to many problems in relation 
to the application of institutional acts (SÁNCHEZ LORENZO S., “Direction général des Registres et du 
Notariat du 24 janvier 2005”, Rev. crit. 2005, 618-627, at 619 and 626-627); but the outcome of this 
situation is perhaps a matter of time. 
5 QUIÑONES ESCÁMEZ A., “Límites a la celebración en España de matrimonios internacionales 
del mismo sexo”, Revista Jurídica de Catalunya 2005, 1171-1187, at 1186; ÁLVAREZ GONZÁLEZ S., 
“Matrimonio entre  personas del mismo sexo y doctrina de la DGRN: una lectura más (crítica)”, Diario 
La Ley, n. 6629, 15 January 2007, 1-3. 
6 Leave was not granted to the questions on the grounds that civil registrars are not entitled by 
the law to submit questions to the Constitutional Court: See Autos 505/2005 and 508/2005, both 13 
December 2005, and Auto 59/2006 of 15 February 2006 (http://www.tribunalconstitucional.es). The 
Constitutional Court has, however, granted leave to the question submitted by the PP (Partido Popular), 
main party in the opposition. 
7 See QUIÑONES ESCAMEZ A., “Circulaire de la DGRN du 29 juillet 2005, sur les mariages civils 
entre personnes du même sex”, Rev. crit. 2006, 855-858. 
8 Art. 9 Law of the Civil register, of 8 June 1957 (Ley del Registro civil), BOE n. 151, 10 June 
1957. 
9 The promptness of the response is, in fact, one of its most remarkable virtues: See ÁLVAREZ 
GONZÁLEZ S., (note 5) at 1, and id., “Resolución-Circular de la DGRN 29 de julio de 2005, sobre 
matrimonios civiles entre personas del mismo sexo”, Revista Española de Derecho Internacional 2005, 
1007-1012, at 1008. 
10 Issued to give a response to the consultation of the civil registrars that raised doubts about the 
possibility of authorising same-sex marriages. 
11 For it is legally binding both for civil registrars and jurisdictional courts, as long as it is not 
contrary to any hierarchically superior –or equal, but subsequent– legal rule: See PERÉ RALUY J., Derecho 
del Registro Civil, t. I, Madrid 1962, at 52.  
12 As the Resolución-Circular itself points out, municipal civil registrars may authorise a 
marriage when one of the spouses-to-be is domiciled in Spain. Consular civil registrars have a 
ceremony complies with the formal requirements established by the Spanish Civil 
code.13 Such an outcome (application of Spanish law) could be, in my belief, the 
correct one, but it has been attained without a proper line of argument.14  
 Indeed, the solution of the problem depends upon the qualification of the gender 
requirement. If it is considered to be a matter of “capacity” and if the law applicable to 
“capacity to marry” is established by article 9.1 Cc –as asserted by the DGRN in the 
beginning of its decision–15 one ought to agree on the necessity to of answering the 
following two –rather than three–16 questions: (1) are foreign laws that prohibit same-
sex marriages compatible with Spanish international public policy; and, (2) as long as 
the application of article 9.1 Cc may treat same-sex couples differently, is it in line with 
the Spanish Constitution. However, if the gender requirement is classified as a part of 
the content of marriage, then the only relevant issue is the law applicable to content of 
marriage. The DGRN ends its resolution by asserting that the gender requirement is a 
matter of the content of marriage, subject to Spanish substantive provisions. 
Nevertheless, in reaching this conclusion it devotes many lines to defending the 
availability of an exception under international public policy, and against both the 
application of a foreign law that does not grant same-sex partners the right to marry17 
and the proposition that article 9.1 Cc is compatible with the Spanish Constitution.  
Objections could be made to the treatment given to both issues,18 as well as 
against some other assertions that are found throughout the decision,19 but the space 
of this comment is limited. Therefore, I will confine my discussion to the proper 
qualification of the gender requirement (section II.A) and to the corresponding 
applicable law (section II.B), paying special attention to the arguments of the DGRN. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
competence if (1) one of the future spouses is Spanish; (2) neither of them is a national of the receiving 
country; and (3) at least one of them is domiciled within the consular district of the authority.  
13 Once authorised by the civil registrar, the wedding ceremony can take place either before the 
same authorising registrar or before any other competent authority (civil or religious) in Spain (municipal 
marriage) or in a foreign country (consular marriage). In this last case, it is a must that the receiving 
country does not prohibit the celebration of foreign consular marriages within its territory. See OREJUDO 
PRIETO DE LOS MOZOS P., La celebración y el reconocimiento de la validez del matrimonio en el Derecho 
internacional privado español, Navarra 2002, at 166-171. 
14 See also ÁLVAREZ GONZÁLEZ S. (note 5), SÁNCHEZ LORENZO S. (note 4), ARENAS GARCÍA R, 
“La doctrina reciente de la DGRN en materia de celebración del matrimonio en los supuestos 
internacionales”, Anuario Español de Derecho internacional privado 2005, 351-371at 368.  
15 However, see infra.  
16 There is still a third question for the DGRN:  “Is the requirement of gender to be considered an 
objective requirement, rather than a subjective one?” This question, erroneously presented by the DGRN 
in the framework of the problems that arise concerning the application of article 9.1 Cc, should logically 
be the first one to be answered. 
17 The DGRN draws an analogy between the application of the exception when the civil registrar 
authorises a same-sex marriage and when the authorisation is requested by a transsexual –male to female– 
foreigner to marry a Spanish man: see some extracts of the decision in Rev. crit. 2005, 614-618 and the 
comments by SÁNCHEZ LORENZO S. (note 4). 
18 Especially to the second one: If article 9.1 Cc is the rule applicable to the capacity to marry, 
one may invoke the convincing arguments concerning the lack of harmony between the constitutional 
principle of equality and (Italian similar) PIL provisions relating to the celebration of marriage given by 
ROMANO G.P., in “Is Multilateral Conflict Rule on Capacity to Marry in Line With The Italian 
Constitution?”, this Yearbook 2005, 205-237. 
19 See, for instance, the arguments against the interpretation of the DGRN upholding the 
“reenvoi” to a foreign law by ÁLVAREZ GONZÁLEZ S. (note 5) at 2; SÁNCHEZ LORENZO S. (note 4) at 622. 
II. Celebration of same-sex marriages in PIL situations: a critical revision of 
the doctrine of the DGRN 
A.  The qualification of gender requirement 
 
According to the traditional conception in Spanish PIL literature, there are two 
categorical requirements for a valid marriage: substance” (i.e. capacity and consent) 
and form.20 Thus, under this view marriage is the only legal relationship that “lacks” 
content.21 While the reason for such an anomalous treatment may be debated, the fact 
is that marriage can no longer be considered a “natural institution.”22 The celebration of 
a marriage entails the acceptance of certain rights and duties that are set by the law 
according to the particular view of the institution’s socio-political and economic function. 
Each national legal system regulates the content of marriage in a different way; 
therefore, a universal conception of marriage no longer exists. For a marriage to be 
valid, the potential spouses must fulfil the requirements of capacity to consent, follow 
the formalities, and accept the specific rights and duties established by a certain legal 
order. As a result, it is necessary to renew the said traditional conception of mariage 
when considering that marriage is, as any other legal institution, subject to 
requirements of capacity, form, and content.23 
 If this is so, it is also crucial to rearrange the qualifications given to certain 
requirements under the traditional conception. For instance, among the subjective 
requirements set by the law, there are some that have traditionally been considered 
pertaining to the “capacity to marry” because they are directly related to the individuals. 
However, it is possible to distinguish between certain requirements that have 
previously been grouped together under capacity. Those that are linked to the capacity 
to consent, which are mainly directed at the protection of the spouses-to-be (e.g. age 
and full mental capacity), can be differentiated from those that are connected to the 
rights and duties of marriage (which try to protect the institution).24 Thus, the content of 
marriage is made up of both the rights and duties of the spouses and some subjective 
requirements that the couple must (or do not have to) meet to get married. As the 
DGRN recognizes, the gender requirement is one of these subjective considerations.25 
Certainly, the opening up of marriage to same-sex partners is a matter of the 
conception of marriage. The amendment to the Spanish Civil code has entailed a legal 
adaptation of this notion, in harmony with the evolution of Spanish society’s idea of the 
function of marriage. In fact, there are very few detractors of the reform that do not 
refer to the “classical concept” of the institution in order to justify both their rejection of 
                                                 
20 See e.g., in this same context, ABARCA JUNCO A.P./GÓMEZ JENE M., “Breves notas sobre la 
Resolución-Circular de 29 de julio de 2005, de la Dirección General de los Registros y del Notariado, 
sobre matrimonios civiles entre personas del mismo sexo”, Revista Electrónica de Estudios 
Internacionales 2006 (www.reei.org), at 1. 
21 So ARENAS GARCÍA R, (note 14) at 354-357. 
22 Ibidem at 354-355 draws attention to the influence of Canon marriage. 
23 Ibidem. 
24 Ibidem. The possibility of celebrating a polygamous marriage (or not) could also be considered 
a matter of content, as it depends on the conception of the institution too. See id., Crisis matrimoniales 
internacionales. Nulidad matrimonial, separación y divorcio en el nuevo Derecho internacional privado 
español, Santiago de Compostela 2004, at 202.  
25 ARENAS GARCÍA R. (note 24) at 202 had already pointed out at this qualification. SÁNCHEZ 
LORENZO S. (note 4) at 624-625 does agree; and QUIÑONES ESCÁMEZ A. (note 5) at 1179-1180 suggests 
that the law amending the Civil code could be regarded as an imperative law, but as a result of the 
consideration of the auctor regit actum principle, which leads to the application of the lex auctority, and 
not as an exception to the conflict of law rule. See also id. (note 7) at 856-857. 
same-sex marriages and their preference for the regulation of same-sex couples under 
the institution of partnership26.  
 
B.  The law applicable to content of marriage 
 
To the extent that the possibility of celebrating a marriage between two people of the 
same sex can be considered a matter of content, a question of law issue arises when 
Spanish authorities celebrate these marriages in international situations The Spanish 
PIL gives no express answer to the determination of applicable law (lex matrimonii). 
The DGRN declares Spanish law to be applicable by appealing to different arguments, 
none of which are sufficiently founded27. 
In the absence of a specific conflict of law rule, one may be tempted to uphold 
the analogical application of article 9.1 Cc, for it aims at regulating the law applicable to 
“capacity and civil state.” Certainly, the concept of “civil state” covers all the 
fundamental facts that are related to the persona, such as birth, death, name, sex,28 
age, filiation, and marriage. Nevertheless, there are at least three good reasons to 
reject this solution. 
 First, even if it is true that this provision sets a general rule in Spanish PIL, it is 
subject to many exceptions, one of which is precisely the solemnisation of marriage. In 
fact, if article 9.1 Cc were applied to the content of marriage, it would be the only 
requirement subject to this rule. The only conflict of law rule expressly set in Spanish 
PIL dealing with the celebration of a marriage before Spanish authorities is article 49 
Cc, which regulates form. And even if the law applicable to capacity to marry could be 
subject to the general conflict of law rule on capacity,29 in practice the authorities 
generally apply Spanish law.30  
Second, lex auctoritatis must be applied to the rights and duties of the 
spouses.31 Therefore, applying any other law to the subjective requirements of 
marriage which are directly linked to the spouses’ inherent rights and duties, would 
entail an utterly inconvenient division of the marriage content law.  
Finally, and most importantly, if marriage lacks a universal configuration and 
each authority can apply but a single law to determine what marriage is being 
                                                 
26 See e.g. ABARCA JUNCO A.P./GÓMEZ JENE M. (note 20) at 4. It is the view held by the Spanish 
Consejo de Estado in its Opinion (Dictamen) of 15 December 2004. 
27 The DGRN refers to the analogy with same-gender partnership, to the forum- ius correlation, 
to favor matrimonii and to some fundamental rights, without any further explanation. 
28 Therefore, sex is subject to personal law according to art. 9.1 Cc, but just as far as its 
determination concerns. Once the sex of the spouse-to-be is established by the means of the application of 
her or his national law (as far as this law does not violate Spanish international public policy: see Res. 
DGRN of 24 January 2005, and the “Note” by SÁNCHEZ LORENZO S., note 4) the recognition of his or her 
right to marry another person of a different or the same sex is related to the content of marriage and, 
therefore, it is to be regulated by the law according to which the marriage is to be celebrated, i.e., the lex 
matrimonii. 
29 Such is the view of the DGRN, coincident to the opinion of the great majority of Spanish 
authors. The DGRN asserts that “there is no room to doubt which law is applicable to the capacity to 
marry”, but most of the arguments set to base this statement could easily be refuted. For instance, it is 
clear that when art. 9 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (OJ C 364, 18 
December 2000) establishes that “The right to marry and the right to found a family shall be guaranteed 
in accordance with the national laws governing the exercise of these rights”, it is performing a remission 
to State laws for the regulation of marriage, and not setting a conflict of law rule, as the DGRN suggests. 
30 OREJUDO PRIETO DE LOS MOZOS P. (note 13), at 84-90; FERNÁNDEZ ROZAS J.C./SÁNCHEZ 
LORENZO S., Derecho internacional privado, 3rd ed., Madrid 2004, at 435.  
31 See OREJUDO PRIETO DE LOS MOZOS P., “Tratamiento registral de los matrimonios de 
complacencia: lectura crítica de la Instrucción de la Dirección General de los Registros y del Notariado de 
31 de enero de 2006”, Diario La Ley n. 6542, 5 September 2006, 1-8, passim.   
celebrated, that law can only be its own law. There must be a single lex matrimonii 
regulating the content of marriage and that law is the lex auctoritatis. Whenever a 
marriage is celebrated before a Spanish authority, it is a matter of Spanish law to 
decide which are the rights and duties the spouses accept and, accordingly, whether or 
not marriage is open to same-sex couples. 
 
III. Conclusion 
 
The problems that have arisen concerning the celebration of same-gender marriages 
before Spanish authorities reveal the convenience of revising the Spanish PIL marriage 
rules. The absence of an express conflict of law rule regulating either the capacity to 
marry or the content of marriage creates a legal uncertainty that the decisions of the 
DGRN -due to their lack of argument- only partially resolve. In order to remedy this 
ambiguity, it is necessary to enact specific conflict of law rules which declare Spanish 
law applicable to both types of requirements. Therefore the law should cover the  
capacity to marry, as a matter of simplification,32 and the content of marriage, as a 
matter of necessity. Thus, as far as celebrating marriages before Spanish authorities is 
concerned, Spanish law would apply to every requirement. By doing so, the conflict of 
law rules would have two positive effects. First, they would reflect the present 
widespread practice that entails the application of the lex fori to the constitution of legal 
relationships related to civil status, as a means of both granting the individuals that 
have a certain linkage to the legal system the right to access to the institutions 
recognized by that system. And second, they would promote the harmony of solutions 
by avoiding a conflict of status.33  
 
                                                 
32 Even if I have reconsidered the qualification that is to be given to each of the requirements set 
by the law to celebrate a marriage (I used to follow the classical distinction, and so I did not consider the 
lack of a proper distinction between capacity, form and content), I still think that capacity to marry is 
mainly regulated by rules that reflect a public interest, which hinders the application of more permissive 
foreign rules, and that foreign rules that regulate capacity to marry in a more restrictive way should not be 
applied, for they would impair the creation of a legal relationship where Spanish rules would grant the 
right to create it (bearing in mind that Spanish authorities are competent to participate in its creation). See 
OREJUDO PRIETO DE LOS MOZOS P. (note 13) at 57 ss. 
33 See both in ROMANO G., “La bilatéralité éclipsée par l’autorité. Développements récents en 
matière d’état des personnes”, Rev. crit. 2006, 457-519. 
Con formato: Fuente: 11 pt
